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 1 
DEFYING MERCANTILISM. ILLICIT TRADE, TRUST, AND THE JAMAICAN 
SEPHARDIM, 1660-1730 
NUALA ZAHEDIEH* 
University of Edinburgh 
The rise of Atlantic history since the 1980s, and the more recent global turn, have 
encouraged a reconfiguration of the borders within early modern historiography. 
The mercantilist framework inherited from the nineteenth century with its focus on 
individual nation states, and self-contained imperial systems, has given way to a 
new emphasis on cooperation and complementarity across dividing lines.1 A high 
proportion of this activity was illegal, and cannot be measured in any systematic 
way but, nonetheless, it is clear that large volumes of people and goods moved 
between empires. In the case of Jamaica, a smugglers’ emporium, estimates suggest 
that, in the late seventeenth century, the island’s contraband commerce out-valued 
trade in its own commodities. 2 Smuggling was more than a marginal activity, and 
                                                        
School of History Classics and Archaeology, University of Edinburgh, EH8 9AG. 
n.zahedieh@ed.ac.uk. 
* Earlier versions of the paper were given at seminars at the Huntington Library, Ca., 
the Institute of Historical Research, the University of Edinburgh, and the British 
Group of Early American Historians. The author is grateful for helpful discussion on 
each occasion. The author is also grateful to Christian Koot and the anonymous 
referees for their constructive comments. 
1 Jack P. Greene and Philip Morgan, eds., Atlantic history: A critical appraisal (New 
York, 2009); Thomas Bender, ‘Foreword’ in Jorge Canizam-Esquerra and Erik R. 
Seeman, eds., The Atlantic in global history: 1500-2000 (Upper Saddle River, N.Y., 
2007), p. xvii. 
2 ‘An estimate of what value is shipt every year from Jamaica to England’ 24 July, 
1700, TNA CO 138/10, fo. 76; The National Archives (TNA) Cust 3/3-5; Nuala 
Zahedieh, ‘The merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish contraband trade, 
1655-1692’, William and Mary Quarterly, 63 (1986), pp. 570-93. 
 2 
according to Bernard Bailyn, illegal flows were integral to the working of the 
intensely competitive Atlantic system. 3  
Despite heightened awareness of the porousness of national boundaries 
there has been relatively little analysis of how economic cooperation functioned in 
illicit trade but it is clear that its importance complicates narratives of 
‘modernization’ which find favour with many economists. According to Douglas 
North and his followers, the development of long-distance trade required an 
institutional evolution in which traditional, communitarian, and supposedly 
inefficient, private-order institutions, gave way to modern, individualistic, and 
efficient markets characterized by impersonal corporations and state-backed 
contracts.4 Illicit trade does not fit the story. Of necessity, smugglers eschewed 
formal contracts and were reliant on private order institutions for enforcement 
which created new opportunities for traditional forms of business organization, 
such as the merchant diaspora, to adapt, survive, and flourish.  
                                                        
3 Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic history. Concepts and contours (Cambridge, Ma., 2005), p. 
88; P. Andreas, Smuggler nation: How illicit trade made America (New York, 2011); 
Wim Klooster, ‘Inter-imperial smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800’ in Bernard 
Bailyn and Patricia L. Denault, eds., Soundings in Atlantic history. Latent structures 
and intellectual currents, 1500-1830 (Camb. Mass., 2009), pp. 141-80; Christian J. 
Koot, Empire at the periphery. British colonists, Anglo-Dutch trade and the 
development of the British Atlantic (New York, 2011). 
4 Douglass C. North and Robert P. Thomas, The rise of the western world: A new 
economic history (Cambridge, 1973); Douglass C. North, ‘Institutions’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 5 (1991), pp. 97-112. Although the work of Avner Greif, and 
others, has stimulated debates about the role of rules, beliefs, and norms in long-
distance trade most economists consider that they were outperformed by 
impersonal, individualistic institutions in a process of ‘modernization’. For example, 
in Grief’s work, the modern Genoese institutions outperformed the Maghribis. For a 
summary of his arguments developed over two decades see Avner Greif, Institutions 
and the path to the modern economy: lessons from medieval trade (Cambridge, 2006). 
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An examination of Jamaica’s contraband commerce highlights the costs and 
risks attached to the defiance of mercantilism and the difficulty of securing trust 
across imperial boundaries. As English merchants struggled to make a profit, the 
economic arguments for opening island doors to members of the strategically 
networked Jewish diaspora proved persuasive and a small group of Sephardic 
merchants played a prominent role in establishing Jamaica’s illicit trade.5 Yet, as 
Francesca Trivellato has forcefully demonstrated, the diaspora did not conform to 
common stereo-types and was not an ‘idyllic consortia of cooperative kith and kin’ 
any more than it was an ‘inefficient relic of a pre-modern world’. Any assessment of 
the reasons for the Sephardim’s success should avoid totalizing explanations which 
conceive of trustworthiness as an inate attribute of kinship, ethnicity, or religion.6 
Family, countrymen, and co-religionists can often disappoint each other and any 
‘ethnically homogeneous middleman group’ needs to develop a strategy which is 
appropriate to its context.7 In the case of the Jamaican Sephardim, they built on a 
favourable geographical and historical legacy and used restrictions on entry, high 
mobility, good information and credible punishment power to develop an intense 
                                                        
5 Josiah Child expressed the common view that religious toleration and an open 
policy towards aliens and ‘even Jews’ had contributed to Dutch commercial success. 
Josiah Child, A new discourse of trade (London, 1698), p. 103.  
6 Francesca Trivellato, ‘Sephardic merchants in the early modern Atlantic and 
beyond: toward a comparative historical approach to business’, Richard Kagan and 
Philip Morgan, eds., Atlantic diaporsas. Jews, Conversos, and Crypto-Jews in the age of 
mercantilism, 1550-1800 (Baltimore, 2009) pp. 99-122. 
7 Janet Landa drew on field work in south east Asia to argue that in an environment 
with a weak legal infrastructure and positive transaction costs, a ‘rational’ trader, 
will choose trading partners with shared and easily identifiable kinship and ethnic 
characteristics. Janet Landa, ‘A theory of the ethnically homogeneous middleman 
group: An institutional alternative to contract law’, Journal of Legal Studies, 10 
(1981), pp. 349-362. 
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‘diasporic sociability’ which gave them important competitive advantages in a high-
risk business environment. 8  
I 
Cromwell launched an ambitious attack on Spanish America in 1655. After a 
humiliating defeat at Hispaniola, the English forces seized the smaller and much 
poorer island of Jamaica by way of a consolation prize. Initial disappointment soon 
gave way to high hopes that the island would prove a valuable asset as it was 
situated ‘within [the Spaniards] bowels’, straddling the richest trade routes, and 
within easy sailing distance of their major ports.9 Jamaica would provide an ideal 
base for a trade which would allow the English to profit from Spanish America’s 
wealth without the labour and expense of working the mines. 10 
From the first Discoveries, the Spanish empire was seen as a source of almost 
limitless riches. The fabled wealth of the Peruvian and Mexican silver mines was 
seen to falter in the early seventeenth century, but it recovered and, between 1660 
and 1700, annual average output of Spanish American silver has been valued at £2.5 
million and far exceeded that of any other New World commodity including sugar.11 
A population of six to eight million (compared with around 400,000 in British 
                                                        
8 Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert , ‘La Nacion among the nations. Portuguese and other 
trading diasporas in the Atlantic, sixteenth to eighteenth centuries’, Kagan and 
Morgan, eds, Atlantic diasporas, pp. 75-98. 
9  Edward Hickeringill, Jamaica view’d  (London, 1661), p. 46. 
10 Francis Barrington to Sir John Barrington, July 14th 1655, Barrington Papers, vol. 
V, BL Egerton MS 2648, fo. 249. Nuala Zahedieh, ‘Trade, plunder and economic 
development in early English Jamaica, 1655-89’, Economic History Review, 39 
(1986), pp. 205-22. 
11 Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, Silver, trade and war. Spain and America in 
the making of early modern Europe (Baltimore, 2000), p. 24. Noel Deerr, History of 
sugar, 2 vols. (1949-50), I, p. 24. 
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America), strong regional economies, and large towns created a buoyant market for 
enslaved labour, provisions, and manufactured goods which were exchanged for 
bullion, cochineal, cocoa, dyewoods, indigo, precious stones, and other valuable 
commodities.12  
The Spanish crown took measures to limit access to its American markets  
and maximize rents. Colonial commerce was strictly regulated by the Casa de 
Contratacion in Seville and most commodity trade was confined to two supposedly 
annual fleets from Cadiz: the galeones serving Peru via Cartagena and Portobello 
and the flota serving New Mexico via Vera Cruz. 13Although the law excluded 
foreigners they had little difficulty in penetrating the system and, by 1600, they 
dominated the trade. However, in the seventeenth century, profits were squeezed as 
competition intensified; taxes, fees, bribes, and other rents rose; and the fleets 
became increasingly irregular so that capital invested in Cadiz was tied up for years 
and Spanish America was starved of supplies.14 
Mounting difficulties in trading with the monopoly fleets encouraged 
foreigners to attempt to place what had been a rather irregular and opportunistic 
direct smuggling trade on a more solid footing with permanent bases which could 
maintain regular commerce with the Spanish colonies. The Dutch provided a model 
                                                        
12 John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The economy of British America, 1607-
1789 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), p. 54. 
13 Clarence H. Haring, Trade and navigation between Spain and the Indies in the time 
of the Habsburgs (Cambridge, Mass., 1918), pp. 201-230. John Stevens, The Spanish 
rule of trade in the West Indies (London, 1702).  
14 Jean O. McLachlan, Trade and peace with Old Spain, 1667-1750: A study of the 
influence of commerce on Anglo-Spanish diplomacy in the first half of the eighteenth 
century (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 1-30. Geoffrey J. Walker, Spanish politics and imperial 
trade, 1700-1789 (London, 1979), p. 227. 
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at Curacao, a small island off the coast of Venezuala, where they settled in 1634 and 
the West India Company used the slave trade to open Spanish ports.15 The human 
traffic was the one commerce which was not controlled by the Casa and was in the 
hands of independent crown licensees. 16 Not only did Spanish colonists pay high 
prices for enslaved workers but the trade provided cover for contraband commerce 
and the perceived value of this chink in the Spanish imperial wall does much to 
explain the very high esteem in which the slave asiento was held. Until mid-century, 
the English were ill-placed to compete with the Dutch as their early settlements 
were on the eastern periphery of the Caribbean and, given the wind system, they 
had poor access to Spanish markets. However, Jamaica was admirably well suited to 
serve as an emporium for Spanish American trade. 
The English did not expect the Spaniards to open their doors to free trade 
without pressure. After all, the English built their own mercantilist walls around 
their much smaller empire with the Navigation Acts introduced in 1651 and refined 
after the Restoration: all trade with the colonies was to be carried in English or 
colonial ships and valuable (enumerated) commodities were to be exported only to 
                                                        
15 C. H. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580-1680 
(Assen, 1971); P. C. Emmer, ‘”Jesus Christ was good, but trade was better”. An 
overview of the transit trade of the Dutch Antilles, 1634-1795’, in Robert L. Paquette 
and Stanley L. Engerman, eds., The Lesser Antilles in the age of European expansion 
(Gainsville, Fla, 1996), pp. 206-222; Wim Klooster, ‘Networks of colonial 
entrepreneurs. The founders of Jewish settlements in Dutch America, 1650s and 
1660s’, in Kagan and Morgan, eds, Atlantic diasporas, pp. 33-49. 
16 The Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 divided the globe between Spain and Portugal 
with Africa in Portugal’s sphere and so Spain held back from the Atlantic slave trade. 
Foreign merchants obtained crown licenses, or asientos, to fill the gap and supply 
African labour to the Spanish colonies. For a detailed account of the slave asiento 
George Scelle, La Traite Negriere aux Indes de Castille, 2 vols (Paris, 1906). 
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English or colonial ports.17 Even after 1670, when the Treaty of Madrid proclaimed 
peace between Spain and England in the Indies, and implicitly accepted English 
ownership of Jamaica, Spain maintained strict prohibitions on commercial exchange 
or English settlement within its imperial territories.18 However, the treaty did 
permit ships of either nation to enter the other’s harbours with messages from the 
governors, or to ‘wood and water’ when in distress, which were long established 
vehicles for covert trade. Furthermore, in 1662, the English formed a royal 
chartered African Company which immediately obtained a contract to supply the 
holders of the slave asiento with 2,400 enslaved Africans a year from bases in the 
Caribbean and opened Spanish ports to English ships involved in this business.19 
The first contract came to little as English slaving was disrupted by the Second 
Dutch War, but the business gained strength after the Treaty of Madrid and, in 1677, 
the asientistas settled an agent in Jamaica.20 The island maintained a strong role in 
the Spanish slave trade, with its attached smuggling possibilities, down to abolition 
in 1807 although there were repeated changes in organization most noticeably after 
                                                        
17 L. A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws: a seventeenth century experiment in 
social engineering (New York, 1939). 
18 F. G. Davenport, European treaties bearing on the history of the United States and 
its dependencies (Washington, D.C., 1929), II, pp. 187-96. 
19 K. G. Davies, The Royal African Company (London, 1957); Approval of contract 
made with Sir Domingo Grillo and Ambrosio Lomelin, Minutes of General Court of 
African Company, 20 June 1664, TNA T 70/75, fos. 11-12. 
20 Sir Joseph Williamson to Lord Vaughan, 12 May 1677, TNA CO 1/138/2, fo. 150;  J. 
F. Osborne, ‘James Castillo – asiento agent’, Jamaican Historical Review, 8 (1971), pp. 
9-18; Zahedieh, ‘Merchants of Port Royal’, p. 390; Nuala Zahedieh, ‘Regulation, rent-
seeking and the Glorious Revolution in the British Atlantic economy’, Economic 
History Review, 63 (2010), pp. 865-90. 
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the British crown took the asiento into its own hands in 1713.21 The monopoly 
contract was bestowed on the South Sea Company which used Jamaica as its main 
base and, with the advantage of factories in Spanish America, expanded access to 
imperial ports.22  
Smugglers who could not colour contraband with some sort of legal business 
which gave access to Spanish American ports resorted to the many bays, creeks, and 
islands lying outside the official gaze. This ‘coast trade’, as it was known, became 
concentrated at fixed points including Monkeys Key in the Samballoes, a few miles 
outside Portobello, the Brew which served Cartagena, and the South Keys of Cuba.23 
With a variety of illicit routes into Spanish markets, the English maintained high 
expectations that, although Spain was unlikely to give them formal access, Jamaica 
would be able to develop a mutually profitable collusive trade for, as Carlisle argued, 
‘a little connivance in this matter to ingratiate the people one to another cannot I 
think amount to any hurt or damage to either crown’.24  
II 
                                                        
21 Nuala Zahedieh, ‘Monopoly and free trade. Changes in the organization of the 
British slave trade, 1660-1720’, in Proceedings of the Instituto di Storia Economica, 
44 (2014), pp. 651-62. 
22 In 1715, the SSC was allowed six staff at each of its factories in Panama, 
Portobello, Cartagena, Vera Cruz, and Buenos Aires. Memorandum to Committee of 
Correspondence, 1715, BL Add MS 25,562, fo. 56.  
23 ‘Notes on illicit trade carried on by sloops from Jamaica with the Spanish’, 
undated, National Library of Jamaica (NLJ), MS 1049. Nathaniel Uring, A history of 
the voyages and travels of Capt. Nathaniel Uring, (1726), pp. 164-166. For a detailed 
description of Monkey Island see Thomas Ekines to Hans Sloane, n.d., British Library 
(BL), Sloane MS 4047, fo. 170. 
24 Carlisle to Governor of Santiago in Cuba, 21 Sept. 1680, TNA CO 138/3, fo. 432. 
The English authorities did not disapprove of trade in manufactured goods but 
refrained from official sanction which would have caused offence to the Spanish 
crown. Report about Jamaica, 28 May 1679, TNA CO 138/3, fo. 310. 
 9 
Despite the high hopes of easy profits, the direct contraband trade proved 
tricky: transactions costs were high and profit margins slim.25 Smugglers were, of 
course, subject to all the perils of legal commerce. It was difficult to match supply 
and demand, as fashion was fickle, and consumer tastes changed. The small, 
competitive markets in which the Dutch, French and other nations vied with the 
English for a share, were often over-stocked and goods had to be unloaded at a loss 
or returned unsold. 26 In addition, smugglers had to risk making bargains without 
assistance from resident agents or the written documentation expected in legal 
exchange. Care was taken to avoid incriminating paper trails at every stage of the 
trade. Supercargoes might carry letters for Spanish merchants but they did not carry 
invoices or bills of exchange in either direction and little was copied into the letter-
books which were usually produced as evidence in court cases.  Transactions on the 
coast rested on verbal agreements and, on return home, the supercargoes did not 
provide written accounts.27 Smugglers had limited recourse to formal contract 
enforcement if they were cheated by traders on either side of the border. 
Furthermore, if they were betrayed and information was passed to an official, goods 
                                                        
25 Jamaican advocates of clandestine trade provided optimistic estimates that costs 
would be half those in the Cadiz trade, Peter Beckford to Williamson, 6 Dec. 1675, 
CSP Col., 1675-1676, No. 735. 
26 On competitive conditions see James Houston, Dr Houston’s memoirs of his own life 
time (London, 1747), pp. 222-4. Abraham and Diego Gonzalez to Nathan Simson, 9 
March 1724, Isaac v. Defriez (hereafter Simson Papers), TNA C 104/13. Tho. Erkines 
to Sir Hans Sloane, n.d., BL Sloane MS 4047, fo. 170. Sardi’s memorandum to the 
South Sea Company (SSC), 10 Sept. 1714, BL Add MS 25,562, fo. 28; Halls to 
Brailsford, 10 Sept 1688; 11 March 1688/9, Peers and Tooke v. Brailsford (hereafter 
Brailsford papers), TNA C 110/152; Naval Officer’s Shipping Returns, TNA CO 
142/14. 
27 A report of 1725 claimed that ‘on their return [supercargoes] ordered the persons 
concerned their proportions without giving them any account of sales’. Journal of the 
Assembly of Jamaica, (JAJ), II, p. 483. 
 10 
were liable to confiscation, and although the trader might obtain restitution, they 
would be made to ‘to pay through the nose for it’.28 It was important to have access 
to inside influence and information. 
Risks were especially high at sea. As foreign interlopers expanded trade in 
the late seventeenth century, the Spanish colonial authorities were authorized to 
take retaliatory action against ‘the pirates’ and commission coast guards who seized 
any vessel carrying so-called ‘Spanish’ commodities.29 Smugglers not only lost their 
ship and goods but also their liberty and, in 1681, the Jamaican governor reported 
that twelve island vessels had been taken in the previous nine months and that 
between 300 and 400 Englishmen were being held ‘as slaves’ in the Spanish 
Indies.30 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the mutual hostilities increased in the 
eighteenth century and, in 1718, Governor Lawes complained that ‘pyrates have 
lately taken up of thirty sail of ships and vessels trading to and from this island’. 31  
Smugglers attempted to improve risk management and reduce transactions 
costs at every stage of the trade. They sought current information about consumer 
preferences and market conditions.32 They employed reputable and experienced 
captains and super-cargoes to accompany the goods and devised profit-sharing 
arrangements to reduce opportunism and encourage good performance: the price of 
                                                        
28 Houston, Memoirs, p. 224. 
29 Harold Bensusan, ‘The Spanish struggle against foreign encroachment in the 
Caribbean’, (PhD thesis, University of California, 1974), pp. 96-100, 153, 155. On 
informers, Lawes to Lords of Trade, 1 Sept. 1718, TNA CO 137/13, Pt 1, No. 16. Copy 
of the Spaniards commission translated, TNA CO 1/54, No. 101. 
30 Draft of a Memorial to be delivered to Don Pedro Ronquillo touching injuries done 
to the English in America, Nov. 1681, TNA CO 1/47, No. 97. 
31 Sir Nicholas Lawes to Lords of Trade, 3 May 1718, TNA CO 137/13, Pt 1, No. 10. 
32 Abraham and Diego Gonzalez to Nathan Simson, 1 December 1722, 17 July 1723, 
Simson Papers, TNA C 104/14, Box 1. 
 11 
goods was fixed in advance and, if goods were sold, the sloop and supercargo 
retained half the profit but, if the goods were unsold, the owner paid no freight or 
charges.33 Vessels were well-armed and heavily manned (at double wages).34 Many 
sailed in fleets of four or five and some secured naval convoy although they paid a 
hefty fee for protection (in 1718, naval captains charged 12.5 per cent for protection 
and 5 per cent on sales as commission).35  
On the coast, everything was done to promote ‘uneasy trust’.36 Although 
English merchants could not settle permanent agents, they made efforts to establish 
regular trading partnerships, monitor reputations, and, above all, to forge reliable 
links with office-holders in the colonial administration.37 Nathaniel Uring, a 
merchant who traded on the coast at the end of the War of Succession, described 
how all negotiations were conducted in Spanish, performed face-to-face, and 
followed well-established routines and rituals: commodities were subjected to full 
and open inspection before witnesses, payment was taken on delivery, and credit 
                                                        
33 Halls to Aylward, 21 Nov. 1688, Brailsford Papers, TNA C 110/152; Mr Kent and 
Mr Thornton to SSC, 5 June 1714, Committee of Correspondence, BL Add MS 25,550, 
fo. 9. 
34 ‘The Present State of the Government of Jamaica’, 20 Aug. 1671, TNA CO 138/2, fo. 
96; ‘Memorandum given in by the Naval Officer’, 25 March 1679, TNA CO 1/43, 
fo.59; Lynch to Jenkins, 6 Nov. 1682, National Maritime Museum (NMM); ‘An 
account of the ships and vessels that were lost or received damage in the late 
hurricane’, 1726’, TNA CO 137/16, fo. 172b. Zahedieh, ‘Merchants of Port Royal’, p. 
581. 
35 Lawes to Lords of Trade, 21 June 1718, TNA CO 137/13, Pt 1, No. 13; JAJ, II, pp. 
338, 482-3. 
36 The term is used by Lauren Benton, Law and colonial cultures: legal regimes in 
world history, 1400-1900 (Cambridge, 2002), p. 26.  
37 El Gov. de Yucatan contra Alonso Matheos sobre et tratos commercios con el 
enemigo Ingles, AGI Mexico, 48, R. 1, No. 42; Virrey de Nova Espana a V Magd, 22 
Feb 1678, AGI Mexico, 50, No. 27. 
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was not given.38 However, all these measures raised expenses and could not fully 
compensate for the difficulties of establishing trust across a linguistic, religious, and 
cultural divide. There was huge temptation to betray so-called friends at every link 
in the long chain of transactions especially in conditions of long-standing mutual 
suspicion and hostility.  
Disappointment and failure were commonplace. In 1672, Thomas Lynch, 
who, as governor of the island, did all he could to promote a little ‘underhand’ trade 
with the Spaniards complained that they were the ‘most ungrateful, senseless 
people in the world’ after the seizure and destruction of his own cargo in 
Cartagena.39 The Hall brothers who moved to Jamaica in the 1680s, with high hopes 
of undercutting the Cadiz trade, reported a series of disappointing ventures with 
low prices, unsold goods, and losses to guarda-costas. 40 They largely withdrew from 
trade ‘on the coast’ and instead sold their linens to Jewish merchants who remained 
willing to take the risk of the re-export trade41 In 1700, Governor Beeston 
complained that ‘our trade with the Spaniard is much abated by their dishonest and 
unjust dealing’ and, in the 1720s, James Houston, a Scottish merchant who spent 
                                                        
38 Uring, History, pp. 164-6. 
39 Lynch to Arlington, 2 March 1672, TNA CO 1/28, fos 46-46b; Molesworth to 
Williamson, 28 Sept. 1672, TNA CO 1/29, fo. 7b. 
40 Halls to Brailsford, 11 Mar. 1688/9, 14 Mar. 1688/9, Brailsford Papers, TNA C 
110/152. 
41 By his death in 1696, William Hall had refocused his business away from 
contraband commerce with only £243 tied up in two small ventures on the coast 
and £2,763 in island trade, Inventory of William Hall, Oct. 1699, National Archives of 
Jamaica, Spanish Town (NAJ), Inv. 1B/II/3, Vol. 5, fos. 35-38. 
 13 
many years in the Indies, complained loudly about the costs and uncertainties of 
‘private trade’.42  
It is surprising that, despite the difficulties of trading across linguistic and 
cultural borders without any formal mechanisms for contract enforcement, 
Jamaica’s collusive commerce did reach sizeable proportions.  Although he did not 
record trade with Spanish America, the Naval Officer reported that, in 1679, 40 of 
the 89 ships entering Port Royal from North America or England went on to trade 
with the Spaniards. The continued disparity between entries and clearances in the 
1680s suggests that this ratio was maintained and the largest ships from Europe, 
such as the Blue Dove, carried cargoes valued at above £6,000. In addition, the 
island’s own sloops had ‘little designs with the Spaniards’ which, in 1679, were 
valued at around £20,000 a year.43 Evidence from the Royal African Company’s 
records shows that over a third of the Africans delivered to the island in the 1680s 
were resold to Spanish buyers and this trade provided cover for a comparable trade 
in dry goods and provisions.44 A government report claimed that, in 1706, Jamaica 
exported English goods and slaves to the value of £275,000 to Spanish America.45 In 
1690, Jamaica’s bullion exports to England, earned largely in illicit trade, were 
reputed to be worth above £100,000 and rose to £150,000 a year in 1700 and 
£250,000 in 1706-7, alongside large quantities of Spanish cocoa, indigo, hides, and 
                                                        
42 Beeston to Lords of Trade, 1700, TNA CO 138/10; Houston, Memoirs, pp. 222-28. 
43 Zahedieh, ‘Merchants of Port Royal’, pp. 578-80; ‘Memorandum given in by the 
Naval Officer’, 25 March 1679, TNA CO 1/43, fo. 59. 
44 Zahedieh, ‘Merchants of Port Royal’, pp. 590-1. 
45 According to a report of 1709, in 1706/7,  Jamaica re-exported slaves to the value 
of £56,000; woolens at £149,000, hats, linens at £66,500, and sundries at £3,500, 
Cambridge University Library (CUL), C(h) H Pa. 122/162 
 14 
cochineal.46 Although contemporaries claimed that the island’s trade suffered from 
the South Sea Company’s monopoly, it is clear that contraband commerce continued 
at high levels although much went through different channels. It was with some 
justice that Jamaica was commonly portrayed as England’s ‘silver mine’.47 
III 
According to contemporary commentators such as Governor Lynch much of 
the island’s hard-earned success in the difficult contraband trades could be 
attributed to the activities of a small group of Jewish settlers who began to move to 
the island almost immediately after first settlement.48 These migrants were drawn 
from a highly mobile Sephardic population descended from Iberian Jews who had 
been forcibly converted in the late fifteenth century, and had sustained further 
outflows from the peninsula either to escape religious persecution, or in search of 
economic betterment, or a combination of both.49 They developed a compact, 
decentralized, but well-connected commercial network with populations 
concentrated at points of strategic significance in Iberian American trade and a 
‘mother community’ in Amsterdam where Jews were made relatively welcome and 
                                                        
46 Inchiquin to Lords of Trade, 12 Aug. 1691, TNA CO 138/7, fo. 19; An estimate of 
what value is shipt every year from Jamaica to England’, 24 July, 1700, TNA CO 
138/10, fo. 76; Handasyd to Lords of Trade, 19 Nov. 1706, TNA CO 137/7, No. 35. 
47 Introduction, Francis Hanson, ed., The Laws of Jamaica (London, 1683). 
48 ‘His Majesty cannot have more profitable subjects than they .for they have good 
stocks and correspondents….Cannot find any but the Jews that will adventure their 
goods or persons to get a trade’. Lynch to Arlington, 17 Dec. 1671, TNA CO 1/27, fo. 
167. 
49 New Christianization meant profoundly different things in different families. 
Some maintained their Jewish culture in the secrecy of their homes. Others 
embraced Catholicism. The divide between Old and New Christians was porous with 
much inter-marriage. Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, A nation upon the ocean sea: 
Portugal’s Atlantic diaspora and the crisis of the Spanish empire, 1492-1640 (Oxford, 
2007). 
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where, from the early seventeenth century, they were allowed to practice their 
religion in the open.50 After more than a century of making their faith invisible in the 
peninsula many chose to recover ancient practices and rebuild a public Judaism 
with customs and rituals which promoted community cohesion but set them firmly 
apart from the majority population. As Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert has skillfully 
shown, this self-styled ‘nation’ combined commercial dynamism and a composite 
religious culture born of ‘conversion, exile, survival, and recovery’ which, in many 
cases, supported fluid identities across territorial boundaries. 51 
 The Sephardim played a major role in developing contraband trade in Dutch 
Brazil and Curacao and, after their eviction from Recife, and their readmission to 
England in 1656, the Jews were quick to take advantage of parallel opportunities in 
the English Atlantic world.52 The Navigation Acts aimed to exclude foreigners from 
England’s plantation commerce but, as seen in Menasseh Ben Israel’s petition to 
Cromwell in 1655, the Jews and their supporters could argue that they possessed 
valuable financial and social capital which had contributed to Dutch commercial 
prosperity and would have equal benefits for the English.53 Like Cromwell, the 
                                                        
50 On the importance of decentralized, self-organized networks in Atlantic 
commerce, David Hancock, Oceans of wine. Madeira and the emergence of American 
trade and taste (New Haven, Conn., 2009). 
51 Studnicki-Gizbert, ‘La Nacion among the nations’, pp. 75-76. Discussion of Antonio 
Rodrigues Robles, a resident of mid-seventeenth century London, highlights fluid 
identities. Jacob Selwood, Diversity and difference in early modern London (Farnham, 
Surrey, 2010), 141-148. 
52 Cecil Roth, A history of the Jews in England, 3rd edn. (London, 1964) pp. 154-172; 
Stephen A. Fortune, Merchants and Jews. The struggle for British West India 
commerce, 1650-1750 (Gainesville, Fla., 1984); Jonathan Israel, European Jewry in 
the age of mercantilism, 1550-1750 (Oxford, 1985).  
53 ‘Now in this dispersion….[the Jews] credit one another; and by that means they 
draw the Navigation where-ever they are, where with all of them merchandizing 
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Restoration government was persuaded, and with an urgent need to attract people 
and capital to the infant colonies, Jews who could secure patronage at court and pay 
a fee of £60 or so, were able to obtain patents of endenization which gave them 
rights to trade on the same terms as Englishmen.54 By 1700, there were probably 
between 2,000 and 3,000 Jews scattered around the empire including about 900 in 
London.55  
In 1661, a ‘French’ Jew, Jacob Joshua Bueno Henriques, who had spent two 
years in Jamaica after its capture by the English, promoted his case for endenization 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and having perfect knowledge of all the kinds of Moneys, Diamants, Cochinil, Indigo, 
Wines, Oyle, and other Commodities, that serve from place to place; especially 
holding correspondence with their friends and kinds-folk, whose language they 
understand; they do abundantly enrich the Lands and Country’s of Strangers, where 
they live’, quoted in Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz , The Jew in the modern 
world: a documentary history, 2nd edn. (New York, 1995), p. 11. 
54 Calvin’s case, 1608, laid down the English law of nationality. Those born in 
England, or in countries under the king’s dominion, were subjects. All others were 
aliens and lay under disabilities: they could not own, lease, or inherit real property 
in England or bring legal action that related to real property; they had no political 
rights and could not hold office; they were subject to customs duties imposed upon 
aliens and could not qualify as English under the Navigation Acts. Aliens could apply 
for naturalization by a private Act of Parliament which granted virtually all the 
privileges of a subject but petitioners had to have received the sacrament and were 
required to take oaths which excluded Jews. A grant of denization from the crown, 
as an exercise of its prerogative power, in the form of a Letter Patent, provided Jews 
with an alternative and removed the inability to hold real property, but not always 
the liability to pay aliens’ customs duties, as rights varied with the wording of the 
particular instrument. Daniel Statt, Foreigners and Englishmen. The controversy over 
immigration and population, 1660-1760 (Newark, Delaware, 1995), pp. 32-37.  
55 Between 1660 and 1700 approximately 190 Jewish aliens were endenizened in 
British dominions. Jacob R. Marcus, The Colonial American Jew, 1492-1776, 3 vols. 
(Detroit, 1970) p. 101. There were 853 Jews listed in London in 1695 of whom 203 
were certainly Ashkenazi and possibly another 52 with a balance of 598 Sephardim. 
A. P. Arnold, ‘A list of the Jews and their households in London’, Miscellanies of the  
Jewish Historical Society of England, Part VI (1962), pp. 73- 141.  
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with a well-tried strategy: a claim to knowledge of mineral deposits in the island.56 
Nothing seems to have come of this scheme but, in the following year, a similar ploy 
was used by two Amsterdam Jews with the backing of Sir William Davidson, the 
king’s envoy in the Low Countries who had an interest in promoting the Spanish 
slave trade 57 The bait worked. Prospecting rights were granted with patents of 
naturalization and, in 1663, six Jews embarked for Jamaica with a ‘rich cargo’ and a 
clear indication that they intended to trade. The promised gold was not found and 
two of the Jews soon departed but others set up shop in Port Royal including Moses 
Jesuran Cardosa, who remained in the island until his death, and played a leading 
role in establishing a permanent Jewish presence in the island.58 
 
Table 1  Jewish settlers with patents of endenization in Jamaica in 1672 
Merchant Arrival Birth Probable residence from 
1662 
Language 
Abraham Alvarez c.1669 Spain France, England Spanish 
David Alvarez c.1669 Spain France, England Spanish 
Joseph da Costa 1668 Portugal England, Canaries Portuguese 
                                                        
56  Wilfred S. Samuel, ‘Sir William Davidson, Royalist (1616-1689) and the Jews’, 
Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England, 14 (1942), pp. 66-7. For the 
same ploy in Dutch territories, Klooster, ‘Networks of colonial entrepreneurs’, p. 40. 
57 Davidson was involved in illegal Dutch trade with Barbados in the 1650s. Samuel, 
‘Sir William Davidson’.  
58 ‘The gold finding Jew went home a month since in Capt. Capps bound for London’, 
Lynch to Bennet, 23 May 1664, TNA CO 1/18, fo. 153b. Nuala Zahedieh, ‘The capture 
of the Blue Dove, 1664: policy, profits, and protection in early English Jamaica’ in 
Roderick A. McDonald, ed. West Indies accounts. Essays on the history of the British 
Caribbean and the Atlantic economy (Kingston, 1996), pp. 29-47. 
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Alveringa 
Moses Jesuran 
Cardosa 
c.1663 France? Amsterdam Portuguese 
Solomon Gabay 1668 France Amsterdam, England Portuguese  
David Gomez 1668 Portugal Holland, England Portuguese 
Abraham Lucena c.1663 unknown New York Portuguese 
Jacob Mendes 
Gutterez 
1670 Portugal Portugal, England Portuguese 
Abraham Perara 1669 Amsterdam Flanders, France, 
Barbados 
Portuguese 
Sources: TNA HCA 13/77; Jacob A.P.H. Andrade, A Record of the Jews in Jamaica  
 
 By 1672, Jamaican merchants were complaining about the ‘prejudices and 
inconveniences’ being caused by the ‘infinite number of Jews who daily resort to the 
island’ and brought unwanted competition.59 They were overstating their case, but 
the governor did confirm that the island had a settled community of thirteen ‘free’ 
Jews, of whom nine can be identified from court cases (Table 1). Combined with the 
sixteen Jews ‘which act under them’, women and children, there was a total 
population of around sixty.60 These early arrivals did not come as a group but were 
drawn from dispersed ports scattered around the Sephardic network. Nonetheless, 
they quickly constructed a community which provided a stable base for further 
                                                        
59 Petition of the merchants of Port Royal to Sir Thomas Lynch concerning the Jews, 
11 June, 1672. TNA CO 1/28, No. 63. 
60 Lynch to Council of Plantations, 10 Mar. 1671/2, TNA CO 1/28, fo. 57. 
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Sephardic migration to the island including, at least, two families from Surinam after 
it was handed to the Dutch.61 In 1680, the census of Port Royal, where the 
Sephardim were based, listed twenty-one probable Jewish households (holding 77 
whites and 50 blacks) among the total of 507.62 It also listed 22 Jewish names 
among the 1,101 militia men belonging to the town.63 Further recruits arrived in the 
1680s, including Diego Gonzalez, who left a collection of letters and business 
documents arising from a court case, and Aaron Lamego who, in 1685, was expelled, 
along with other Jews, from French territory. Although Jamaica’s overall white 
population fell back in the 1690s, the Sephardim seem to have more than 
maintained their numbers (Table 2). After Port Royal suffered massive destruction 
in an earthquake in 1692, the Jews established new congregations in Spanish Town 
and Kingston. A document of 1703 claimed that there were eighty Jewish 
households which suggests a total population of around 300, making it the largest in 
British America, and the second largest in the entire Caribbean (after Dutch Curacao 
with around 600).64 In the eighteenth century, Jewish names became increasingly 
                                                        
61Jacob Selwood, ‘Left behind: subjecthood, nationality, and the status of Jews after 
the loss of Surinam’, Journal of British Studies 54 (2015), pp. 578-601. 
62 ‘Inhabitants both masters and servants of Port Royal parish’, TNA CO 1/45, fos. 
96-107. Six of those in Table 1 appear: Abraham Alvarez; Joseph da Costa Alvaringa; 
Moses Cardosa; Solomon Gabay; Abraham Lucena; Jacob Mendez Gutterez. David 
Gomez had died by this time and David Alvarez lived with his father. 
63 ‘List of the several regiments of foot and troops of horse in Jamaica’, TNA CO 1/45, 
fos. 1-25. Not all Jews can be identified by name. Most had Spanish or Portuguese 
names but some were anglicized. In 1718, Abraham Martin, ‘of the Jewish nation’, 
gave evidence in court and swore on the 5 Books of David. TNA CO 137/13, No. 19. 
64  Memorandum from the Jews about tax, 1700, TNA CO 138/10, fo. 82.  
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frequent among surviving probate inventories (Table 3) and according to Benjamin 
Bravo, a resident in the 1720s, the population numbered 700-800 by 1730.65 
 
Table 2 White population of Jamaica 
  Jews   Total whites  Total population 
1673  c.60  7,768   15,536 
1703  c.300  7,365   48,000 
1730  7-800  8,230   83,765  
Sources: Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, I, pp. 20, 28; TNA CO 138/10, fo. 82; 
TNA CO 137/19/2.; TNA CO 137/22, fo. 34 
 
 
  
Table 3  Jewish decedents in Jamaican probate inventories, 1686-1721 
  1686-94 1699-1701  1710-1712  1716-1721 
Total no.  402  145   254   379 
Jews  9  4   6   13 
% Jews 2.23  2.75   2.36   3.43 
Source: Inventories, The National Archives of Jamaica, Spanish Town, 1B/II/3, vols. 
3, 5, 9, 11.  
 
Despite their extravagant claims in the 1660s, the Jews showed little interest 
in planting or mining ‘for their design was only to insinuate themselves into the 
                                                        
65 Benjamin Bravo to William Wood, 17 Feb. 1736, TNA CO 137/22, fo. 34. 
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country for the sake of trade’.66 This was choice and not necessity. The Jews had full 
property rights and it was usual to patent land especially in the early years when 
prices were low.67 All nine of the ‘free’ Jewish settlers who could be identified in 
1672  patented, at least, 300 acres, and most developed plantations, but agriculture 
remained secondary to their commercial activities. For example, at his death in 
1693, Abraham Alvarez owned an indigo plantation in Vere with ‘seventy-six 
working negroes and ten pickaninnies’. Nonetheless, he lived in Port Royal and was 
described as a merchant on his tomb-stone.68 The Jews plainly calculated that they 
had an advantage in trade, and perhaps because of their precarious past, a 
preference for high liquidity. Analysis of 1,180 probate inventories surviving from 
between 1685 and 1721 confirms contemporary assertions that the Jews were 
overwhelmingly urban and commercial.69 At least 24 of the 32 probable Jews lived 
in towns (Port Royal, Kingston, or Spanish Town) and 23 of the 28 for whom 
                                                        
66 ‘A journal kept by Coll. William Beeston from his first coming to Jamaica’, BL Add. 
MS 12,430, fo. 28.   
67  In 1692, a list of twelve Jewish plantation owners was submitted to the Lords of 
Trade to counter claims that they neglected planting. It included five of the nine 
Jews in Table 1 (David Alvarez, Moses Jesuran Cardosa, Joseph da Costa Alveringa, 
Jacob Mendez Gutterez, the widow of Solomon Gabay). TNA CO 390; In December 
1706 a group of so-called ‘planting Jews’ petitioned for an exemption from the 
separate tax imposed on their community ‘in the lump’. 10 Dec. 1706, JAJ, I, p. 405. 
68 Inventory of Abraham Alvarez, Oct. 1693, NAJ, Inv. 1B/II/3 vol. 3, 507; 
Tombstone, 14 March 1693, R. D. Barrett and P. Wright, The Jews of Jamaica and 
Jewish tombstone inscriptions, 1663-1882 (Jerusalem, 1997). 
69 Houston, Memoirs, p. 277. The series of recopied inventories in the Jamaica 
Archives is unfortunately not complete. Volumes 4, 6, 7 and 8 are missing from the 
period 1686-1721. For a discussion of the inventories see Meyers who used a 
different sample. Allan D. Meyers, ‘Ethnic distinctions and wealth among colonial 
Jamaican merchants, 1685-1716’, Social Science History, 22 (1998), pp. 47-81. 
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occupation was given were described as merchants, 4 as planters, and 1 as a 
widow.70 
The merchant inventories show that the Jews were especially interested in 
illicit Spanish commerce and that they were prominent at every stage of the trade.71 
A court case of 1666, showed how they used their European networks to secure 
direct supplies of the European textiles which sold well in Spanish markets.72 By 
making minimum adherence to the Navigation Acts, by simply calling at a south 
coast port, they kept costs down and could offer advantageous terms.73 At other 
times they landed goods from Dutch or French ships in bays and creeks outside Port 
Royal in a well organized smuggling business.74 The Jews were also active in 
                                                        
70 For the period 1686-1721, Abraham Alvarez, Moses Gabay Faro, David Gabay and 
Abraham Azavedo are listed as planters, NAJ, Inventories, 1B/II/3 vols 3, 5, 9 and 
11. 
71 Over half the Jewish merchant inventories suggest an involvement in Spanish 
trade compared with 25 per cent of all the Port Royal inventories, Zahedieh, 
‘Merchants of Port Royal’, p. 579.  
72 ‘Memoria of what goods may be fit for Sta Marta, the rest of the Tierre Firma’, 11 
May 1668, Westminster Abbey Muniments 11940. On the importance of foreign 
goods see the South Sea C’ompany’s cargoes, BL Add MS 25,562, No. 15. In 1724, 
Jacob Alvarez had 40 pieces of fine chintz valued at £100 and 16 pieces of sprig 
Indian chintz valued at £80.5 on board sloops in the Spanish trade, NAJ, Inv. 1B/II/3, 
vol. 14, fos. 60-61. 
73 On direct trade, Zahedieh, ‘Capture of the Blue Dove’. Samuel Haynes, An abstract 
of all the statutes made concerning aliens trading in England, (London,1685) pp. 10, 
29. For Jewish expertise in smuggling in the Thames see a report to the SSC, BL Add. 
MS 25,562, No. 15. On the Jews’ low prices, Francis Hall to Thomas Brailsford, 11 
March 1688/9, 20 Jan. 1689/90, Brailsford Papers, TNA C 110/152. William Wood 
claimed that, by the 1720s, ‘the Jews [are] the only persons almost that have any 
large quantities of all kinds of goods lying in their houses, warehouses, or shops for 
…..making proper sortments of goods for the Spaniards’. William Wood to Lords of 
Trade, 18 Feb. 1735, TNA CO 137/22, fos 35-36. V. L. Brown, ‘The South Sea 
Company and contraband trade’, American Historical Review, 31 (1926), p. 671. 
74 On the smuggling activities of Isaac Lamego and Isaac Lopez Nunez in collusion 
with the Marquis du Quesne (Captain of Port Royal) in the 1720s, JAJ, II, pp. 325, 
482-3, 539.  
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developing the provision trade with North America from where their co-religionists 
delivered flour, beef, kosher beef, and even pork for Spanish markets.75   
The Jamaican Jews seem to have played little direct role in the risky trans-
Atlantic leg of the African slave trade but they obtained human cargoes at the Royal 
African Company’s sales. Moses Jesuran Cardosa, an active contraband trader, was 
the largest single purchaser at the Company’s sales in the 1670s and 1680s buying 
582 Africans at forty-three sales between 1674 and 1686. He paid an average price 
of £9.21 compared with the overall average of £21 which suggests either collusion 
with the Company agent, with whom he at times acted in partnership, or that he was 
concentrating purchases on children and what were described as ‘refuse slaves’ (the 
sick and old) who found ready markets on the poorer parts of the Spanish coast.76 
Court records highlight Jewish involvement in business with the various asiento 
agents revealing large contracts obtained by private merchants such as Isaac da 
Costa Alveringa in the 1690s and  they remained prominent in the smuggling trade 
conducted by South Sea Company employees.77 
                                                        
75 Nathan Simson left 88 bills of lading from 1719 until 1724 which show the 
importance of the Jamaican entrepot to his New York provision business although it 
had not yet outstripped Curacao with 38 per cent of his cargoes consigned to 
Curacao, 29 per cent to Jamaica, 22 per cent to London, and the remaining 11 per 
cent for lesser Caribbean ports and Amsterdam. Simson Papers, TNA C 104/13. On 
Jews and the provision trade in New York, Noah L. Gelfand, ‘A transatlantic approach 
to understanding the formation of a Jewish community in New Netherland and New 
York’, New York History (2008), pp. 375-395. 
76 Cardosa acted in partnership with Walter Ruding on occasion. Trevor Burnard, 
‘Who bought slaves in early America? Purchasers of slaves from the Royal African 
Company in Jamaica, 1674-1708’, Slavery and Abolition, 17 (1996), p. 74. 
77  Richard Brown v. Andrew Lopez and Co. TNA HCA 13/82. The SSC examined Mr 
Dennis’s conduct as chief of the Panama and Portobello factory where he was 
accused of illegal trading in negroes with Benjamin Bravo, Committee of 
Correspondence, SSC, 9 Oct. 1728, BL Add. MS 25,552, fos. 84-85; Bravo purchased 
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After assembling the goods and persons for sale the Jews played an active 
role in taking them to market. By 1679, the island had a fleet of around eighty small, 
stoutly built sloops of which, at any time, around twenty might be engaged in ‘little 
designs with the Spaniards’.78 Some Jews such as Jacob Lopez Torres, listed as a 
mariner in the 1680 census, and an overseer of the Port Royal synagogue, owned a 
number of vessels but others hired shipping and Christian mariners.79 On the other 
hand, the Jews played a prominent role as supercargoes to ensure close personal 
oversight of their own, and their community’s, transactions as well as taking on 
business for Christians, such as the Halls.80 According to Houston, three Jews 
dominated the English coast trade in the 1720s: Aaron Diaz Fernandez, Daniel 
Mendes de Costa, and Moses Mendes and they maintained a sort of floating 
warehouse on the coast which others used to make up stocks for sale. 81 While, as 
noted above, the English were formally excluded from settling  in Spanish territories 
before 1713, and found it intensely difficult to forge reliable business relationships 
across the religious and linguistic divide, the Jews had complete fluency in both the 
Spanish and Portuguese languages, and an appearance which allowed them to pass 
unnoticed in Spanish territory. Although Jewish merchants did not name their 
‘friends’ in Spanish territories it is clear from letters such as those of Diego Gonzalez 
                                                                                                                                                                     
176 slaves from the RAC in 1723, T 70/958, fo. 37-38; 41-42; 43-45. Also see 
Tyndall and Assheton to Isaac Hobhouse, 8 June 1729, 25 Apr. 1729, 20 July 1729, 
Bristol Central Library, Jeffries Collection, Vol. XIII, fos. 100, 103-5, 107. 
78 ‘Memorandum given in by the Naval Officer’, 25 March1679, TNA CO 1/43, fo. 59. 
79 ‘List of the Regiments’, TNA CO 1/45, fos. 1-25; Naval Officers Returns, 2 April 
1703-25 April 1705, TNA CO 142/13.; Petition of Jacob Rodriguez, Deleon, and Jacob 
Lopes Torres overseers of the synagogue, Journal of Assembly of Jamaica, 23 Mar. 
1688, TNA CO 140/2, fo. 114.  
80 Moses Cardosa acted for the Halls in the 1680s. TNA Brailsford Papers.  
81 Houston, Memoirs, p. 309. 
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that they had firm links to  co-religionists as they exported kosher beef. Despite 
prohibitions, and the Inquisition, the Jews had communities in all the major towns 
and had forged a web of clandestine activity with well-established distribution 
channels and long experience with dealing with, and even serving, the regulatory 
regime. 82 They knew who to trust, who to bribe, and how to turn the system to their 
advantage.  
The importance of the Jews in Jamaica’s contraband trade was reflected in 
their importance in trade in re-exported Spanish goods, above all bullion. 83 Over 
half the Jewish inventories surviving from the period between 1685 and 1721 
contained large quantities of bullion with 56 per cent listing above £500 in cash and 
some owning much larger sums such as Jacob Baruch Alvarez, who died in 1724 
with around £3,000 worth of silver and gold.84 Anecdotal evidence and the lists of 
debts in the inventories, including bonds and mortgages, show that the Jews played 
a banking function in the island and during the war of the 1690s, Mennaseh and 
Benjamin Peraira, had a contract to furnish the island’s governor with an annual 
supply of bullion valued at £5,800.85 In 1688, a ship’s captain listed ninety bullion 
consignments for London of which fifteen were on behalf of eight Jews and, although 
not all were valued, they included fifteen barrels of silver worth almost £3,000 
                                                        
82 Diego and Abraham Gonzalez to Nathan Simson, 17 July 1723, Simson Papers, 
TNA C 104/14, Pt1. Marcus, Colonial American Jew, pp. 42-66. Brown, ‘South Sea 
Company’, p. 671. El Gov. de Yucatan contra Alonso Matheos sobre el tratos 
commercios con el enemigo Ingles, AGI Mexico 48, R. 1, No. 42. Selwood, Diversity 
and difference, p. 143. 
83 Edward Long, A history of Jamaica (1774), vol. II, p. 116. 
84Inventory of Jacob Baruch Alvarez, 10 June 1724, NAJ, Inv. 1B/II/3, vol. 14, fos. 60-
61. 
85 Copy of a letter of credit, 17 Jan. 1694/5, TNA CO 138/7, fo.  358.  
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consigned to Abraham de Paiva who was a leading player in London’s bullion 
market.86 Another prominent Jew, Jacob Mears, who settled in Jamaica in 1692, was 
involved with Dummer in the packet boat service used to transport large quantities 
of Spanish silver to England in the War of the Spanish Succession.87 
Jews were also conspicuous in organizing the logwood trade – investing in 
ships used by the cutters and financing export of the product.88 Island records 
suggest that, in the early 1670s, Jamaica exported around 900 tons of Spanish 
logwood a year and, in 1671, around 100 tons were sent to London with 95 per cent 
assigned to one Jewish merchant, Antony Gomezsera (for whom Cardosa was 
factor). 89 Meanwhile, much of the remainder was shipped to Europe, with minimal 
adherence to the Navigation Acts. In 1672, the Providence was seized at Cowes with 
a cargo of 60 tons of logwood intended for sale in Amsterdam on account of eight 
Jamaican Jews.90 The Jews played a similar role in the indigo trade: in 1717, six Jews 
accounted for over half London’s indigo imports from Jamaica whereas, in the 
                                                        
86 ‘Book belonging to Thomas Stubbs’, TNA HCA 30/664. Gedalia Yogev, Diamonds 
and coral: Anglo-Dutch Jews and eighteenth century trade, (Leicester, 1978). 
87 Dummer’s contract with the Post Office in 1704 allowed him to carry cargoes 
which allowed him to move into Spanish American trade via Jamaica  in partnership 
with his brother and the Mears brothers, Jacob and Sampson. Jacob Mears had spent 
16 years trading in Jamaica and claimed knowledge of the trade and contacts with 
co-religionists in Spanish America. Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic 1675-1740. An 
exploration of communication and community (Oxford, 1986), pp. 176-177. 
88 For example, David Gomez owned the Betty ketch included in a list of ships 
trading for logwood, TNA CO 138/1, fo. 105 
89 ‘Memo given in by the Naval Officer’, 25 March 1679, TNA CO 1/43, fo. 59. 
Maurice Woolf, ‘Foreign trade of London Jews in the seventeenth century’, 
Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England, 24 (1974), 38-58. 
90 Perara and Gomezsera v. Calloway, Sept. 1672, TNA HCA 13/77. 
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1720s, drawback on duties on re-exported indigo at Port Royal shows that six Jews 
accounted for over a third of the trade.91  
Just as it is impossible to estimate the value of Jamaica’s illegal trade with 
Spanish America, it is even more difficult to assess the proportion in the hands of 
Jewish merchants, although contemporary commentators had no doubt that their 
share was disproportionate to their numbers and it was often claimed that they 
dominated the trade.92 In 1672, at least thirteen Jewish merchants were doing 
business on a substantial scale and in 1664 Cardosa and Mesquita received a cargo 
worth around £6,000 on the Blue Dove alone. 93 By the 1720s there were at least 
twenty Jewish merchants with inventories suggesting that they turned over trade in 
excess of £5,000 a year.94 
Despite their heavy focus on the riskiest trading sector the Jews prospered. 
Probate evidence shows that Jews accounted for almost 20 per cent of estates 
valued at above £2,000 in the period 1686-92 and the mean value of the Jewish 
estates identified for the period 1686-1721 was £1,930. In a separate survey, 
Meyers compared the wealth of 32 Jewish merchants he identified from the period 
1685-1716 with that of 89 non-Jewish merchants and found that the former were 
significantly richer. The median wealth of the Jewish estates was £1,509 and 56 per 
cent were valued above £1,000 while the median wealth of the non-Jewish estates 
                                                        
91 London Port Books, 1717. West Yorkshire Record Office, Sheepscar Branch, Leeds.  
JAJ, vol. II, pp. 325, 348, 525, 527. 
92 John Taylor, ‘Taylor’s history of his life and travels in Jamaica’, 1688, NLJ MS 105, 
fo.  499; Houston, Memoirs, p. 277. 
93 Zahedieh, ‘Blue Dove’, pp. 34-37.  
94 For example see Inventory of Jacob Baruch Alvarez, 10 June 1724, NAJ, Inv. 
1B/II/3, vol. 14. Fos. 60-61. 
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was £406 and 28 per cent were valued above £1,000. Jewish merchants possessed 
about three times as much wealth as the Anglo merchants, and their wealth was 
more evenly distributed. Meyers noted that ‘Anglo anxieties about the collective 
wealth of the Sephardim, while probably exaggerated, would appear to be 
substantiated’.95 
IV 
 The evidence suggests that Jamaica’s small Jewish community played a 
disproportionately large role in the island’s trade, above all, contraband commerce 
and that, despite the high risks, the Jews flourished economically. Christian rivals 
denounced the Jews for trading as a ‘perfect monopoly’, and operating as ‘a kind of 
joint stock company’. 96 In fact, the Sephardim eschewed company organization, and 
like the private traders whose locally-informed initiatives have been shown to have 
driven East India Company expansion after 1660, the Jews maintained high levels of   
individual autonomy and flexible, fluid organization within a decentralized network 
with thick horizontal links.97 They drew on strong social capital, which had been 
accumulated over generations of  dispersal, to create local cohesion and high levels 
of cooperation and collaboration with other groups over a wide geographic area. 98  
                                                        
95 Meyers, ‘Ethnic distinctions and wealth’, p. 75.  
96 Petition of the merchants of Port Royal to Sir Thomas Lynch concerning the Jews, 
11 June 1672, TNA CO 1/28, No. 63. 
97 Emily Erikson, Between monopoly and free trade. The East India Company, 1600-
1757 (Princeton, 2014). 
98 Social capital is here understood as ‘features of social organization such as trust, 
norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions’, Robert D. Putnam, Making democracy work (Princeton, 1993), 
p. 167. 
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The geographic reach and decentralized structure of the Sephardic diaspora 
is seen in the backgrounds of the group of ‘free’ Jews who settled in Jamaica by 
1672. Nine of the thirteen can be identified from court cases and other sources 
(Table 1) and although all but the Spanish Alvarez family (father and son) identified 
themselves as ‘of Portuguese extraction’ their birth-places were dispersed: three 
were born in Portugal, three in France, two in Spain, and one in Amsterdam. All had 
led peripatetic lives.99 Most had moved between, at least, three countries (including 
Jamaica) in the previous 10 years. Between them, they had gained first-hand 
experience of, at least, eleven countries including Barbados, Brazil, the Canaries, the 
Dutch Republic, France, Italy, New York , Portugal and Spain. At least two thirds of 
them had lived for some time in the Iberian peninsula where they would have had to 
assume a Christian identity. All had passed through London, though often for a very 
short time, and obtained patents of endenization with a clause which allowed them 
to trade on the same foot as Englishmen. All had agents in both London and in 
Amsterdam (where at least four had close kin).  
While benefiting from broad networks, Jamaica’s early Jewish settlers had to 
work to mould a group of relative strangers into a cohesive community. Only four of 
the nine had a close kin connection: Abraham and David Alvarez were father and 
son; the partners Solomon Gabay and David Gomez married two Perara sisters and 
so were brothers-in-law. Although all had friends in common, none had first-hand 
acquaintance with every other member of the group before migration to Jamaica. 
However, in adjusting to a new environment they clung together, and as Studnicki-
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Gizbert has argued, they were able to draw on long experience of dispersion and 
mobility and well established strategies for strengthening ties between members. 100 
Until the earthquake of 1692, almost all the Jews settled in Port Royal. The twenty or 
so families lived, worked, and socialized in close proximity, and according to 
testimony provided by a young merchant, Abraham Perara Delgado, the Jews met ‘in 
company’ on a daily basis. 101 In 1677, the leaders, including Moses Cardosa, 
purchased a plot in the middle of Port Royal on which they built a synagogue. 102 
The building provided a symbol of collective affiliation, and difference, a public 
declaration of permanence, and an important social centre for the community, used 
for daily assembly and information exchange, as well as worship.103 
Two new communities were formed in Spanish Town and Kingston after the 
earthquake, but all three were in a radius of twenty miles, and were in close 
communication sustained by overlapping membership and common interests, 
reinforced by a policy of strict endogamy which not only restricted access to the 
group but also necessitated high levels of intermarriage and the formation of dense 
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kin networks.104 The thick web of personal relationships ensured rapid diffusion of 
information about personal and business affairs which facilitated oversight and 
enforcement of norms. 
In forging solidarity and social discipline the Sephardim deployed strategies 
common to the associational culture which flourished throughout early modern 
Europe as all members of the growing bourgeoisie struggled to adjust to the flux and 
mobility of urban life and rapid economic and social change.105 Although Port Royal 
was notorious for its riotous and unruly life-style; the factionalism of economic, 
social and political life; and low levels of probity among the business community, 
the Sephardim stood apart. The Jews successfully promoted the type of conduct 
which is commonly associated with the protestant work ethic: abstemiousness; 
thrift, and self-restraint. 106 However, the Sephardim reinforced their common-place 
sociability with rigorous adherence to a range of customs and rituals which had 
survived and been adapted from before the forced conversions and which set them 
apart.  As seen in tomb-stone inscriptions they maintained their Iberian languages 
among themselves until the late eighteenth century.107 They buried their dead in a 
well-maintained separate cemetery from the 1660s and worshipped in a public 
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synagogue from 1677.108 They observed their own calendar with its Saturday 
Sabbath and religious holidays on which they refused to take part in militia 
training.109 They followed a kosher diet.110 Their young people attended the 
Yeshibah (a school for religious instruction) which inculcated a strong awareness of 
their Jewish heritage, and their ‘difference’, and encouraged members to behave for 
the benefit of the community.111 At the level of the individual, such practices were 
costly. They required time and self-discipline and made it difficult to socialize with 
Christians but, on the other hand, the signaling traits not only strengthened group 
cohesiveness but also lowered the costs of identifying insiders. 112 
In common with other purposeful associations, and friendly societies, of the 
late seventeenth century, the Sephardim cemented group commitment with 
mutuality.113 Membership of the small, tight-knit Jamaican Jewish community 
delivered a range of economic and social benefits which provided household 
security over the life-cycle. Schooling and business training were provided within 
the community. A good marriage brought a handsome dowry. Interest-free loans 
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were available and were especially helpful for those in early career. The articles of 
agreement made between David Lopez Narbona and Solomon Gabay in 1674 show 
that the newly arrived Narbona obtained start-up funding on easy terms as well as 
assistance with his family’s transport costs and initial subsistence.114 Although 
merchants maintained high levels of personal mobility, and flexibility, by avoiding 
large, long-standing, partnerships they came together as ‘a sort of company’ when 
there were clear benefits in collaboration as when eight Jews freighted the 
Providence in 1672.115 There was well-organized relief for those who fell on hard 
times, and in old age, with a compulsory contribution to the ‘poor fund’ levied on all 
trade transactions. Wills show that it was usual to make bequests to community 
institutions and the ‘poor of the Nation’ and there was generous alms giving at 
funerals. 
The tools of sociability and mutuality which were used to bind together the 
Jamaican Sephardim were also used to create and maintain ties and promote 
information exchange with communities overseas. Families had a tendency to 
divide, disperse, and come back together as business opportunities opened and 
closed. For example, Abraham de Lucena moved to Jamaica from New York in the 
1660s but, a generation later, his son returned to New York to take part in the 
growing trade. 116 Joseph da Costa Alvaringa’s son moved to London in the 1690s 
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and was joined there by his mother after his father’s death.117 Dispersal was 
reinforced by endogamy which often necessitated a move overseas to find a suitable 
partner Esther Marques, daughter of a prominent Jamaican family, married Luis 
Gomez, a large-scale provision merchant trading from New York to the Caribbean 
and two of her sons also married Jamaican Jews who they met in the course of 
working as supercargoes in the family firm. 118 The strong family connections 
between Jamaica and New York Jews are reflected in wills with a third of the New 
York Jewish testaments from between 1700 and 1750 indicating a close family link 
with Jamaica.119 Links could be cultivated and maintained through conversations in 
written correspondence, as emphasized in David Hancock’s work on the Madeira 
wine business, but the Jews reinforced these ties through frequent face-to-face 
contact.120Jewish merchants commonly travelled with their goods and benefited 
from direct contact with their customers. 121 Shared religion took these mobile 
merchants into the Sephardim’s tightly confined social spaces wherever they were 
and ensured rapid transmission of knowledge of personal and business affairs 
which, at times, extended beyond Sephardic networks to Ashkenazi Jews who 
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arrived in small numbers in New York and Jamaica and attended the Sephardic 
synagogue. 122 
As with Amsterdam’s ‘global’ Jews examined by Jessica Roitman, Jamaica’s 
Sephardim did business with those outside their own community.123 They bought 
and sold goods to Christians; they undertook commission business for Christians; 
and they hired Christian mariners. They also undertook business in partnership 
with well-placed individuals who could offer political capital. However, at points 
where most discretion and trust was needed, they relied on insiders, as in generally 
using Jewish supercargoes on the Spanish American coast. Good information about 
the moral and business conduct of members of their own small, close-knit island 
congregation, combined with knowledge of those overseas, to allow early detection 
of bad behaviour and group discipline was enhanced by the supervisory role 
accorded to Jewish leaders. Although records have not survived from the early 
congregation, it is clear that, like other Sephardic communities, the Jamaican Jews 
elected a governing board (Mahamad) which administered the community’s affairs, 
appointed Rabbis, supervised religious and moral order, dealt with internal 
disputes, and represented community interests to the government. Leading 
merchants were also appointed to oversee the rating, assessing, and collection of the 
extraordinary taxes imposed at various times ‘in the lump’ from the 1690s: a role 
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which provided them with detailed financial information about their co-religionists. 
124  
Early English Jamaica was notorious for low levels of business morality.125 
Houston left a colourful picture of the ‘burlesque’ of Jamaica’s business world in the 
1720s and claimed that in Jamaica it was ‘reckoned no disgrace, or loss of credit, to 
fail in, or fall from your word, bill or bond’.126 He was scathing about the corruption 
of the island’s legal system and the difficulties of getting redress for bad behaviour 
through the courts and his sentiments were echoed by the Jewish merchant Diego 
Gonzalez who complained that ‘it doe signifie nothing to go to law, for after you get 
judgement and your money goes in the Provost Marshall’s hands you are as bad as 
before’.127 However, although the Jews did make use of formal contracts within the 
community, as seen in the Articles of Association  between Gabay and Narbona, and 
did also, on occasion, use the courts to sue for debts, as in the case of Mears and de 
Lucena, they were generally able to avoid formal institutions and turn to internal 
mechanisms for settling disputes within the community.128 
Wills and Deeds reveal that, at best, a damaged reputation within the 
community reduced access to group benefits such as apprenticeship, a good 
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marriage, business collaborations, inheritance, and social welfare.129 At worst, 
disgrace threatened partial, or absolute, exclusion from the group which was akin to 
economic and social death. 130  While the forging of a closed and separate 
community, with distinct social practices, increased trust among insiders it also 
defined the Jews as a nation apart. The Hall brothers’s business papers show that 
from 1687 to 1690 they had transactions with seven Jews, of whom four (including 
Moses Jesuran Cardosa) were large repeat customers but, although they made thirty 
three references to ‘a Jew’ in their forty seven letters, they never once endowed 
these individuals, even repeat customers, by name. – names here have been 
extracted from invoices and lists of debts131 The Jews were seen ‘in the lump’ and, at 
best, they were viewed with suspicion and, at worst, with envy and venom. 
According to Houston they were ‘the worst set of rogues that ever I knew ….a set of 
meer low-level thieves’. 132 It was difficult for an expelled Jew to form a new 
network or join the majority population.133 Outsider status not only promoted 
community cohesion among the Jews but also gave the Jewish elders a powerful 
disciplinary tool and, although early English Jamaica’s congregation records have 
not survived, there is evidence that excommunication was a credible threat within 
the Sephardic diaspora especially in places with less integrated and highly visible 
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communities.134 The capacity to better detect and punish opportunistic behaviour 
among their brethren gave the Jews a significant competitive advantage where legal 
enforcement was weak, or entirely absent, as in illicit markets. It could be argued 
that these economic advantages help explain why a stigmatized group persisted in 
maintaining its separate identity. If such distinctiveness had had only costs, and no 
benefits, it would be expected that the signaling traits would have died out through 
a Darwinian mechanism.  
The economic value of high quality information networks and the capacity to 
curb opportunism cannot be computed with precision. Nonetheless, business 
records do demonstrate that these community assets allowed the Jews to reduce 
risk and transactions costs in illicit trade and undercut their Christian rivals. In the 
1680s, Francis Hall, complained that the Jews supplied French silks and stuffs at 
twenty per cent below the usual market price and he repeatedly urged his 
correspondents to withdraw from these trades as they could not compete.135 The 
Jews also charged lower commission rates: a sample of 143 invoices from the period 
1681 to 1725 shows that English merchants charged, at least, 10 per cent 
commission, and their Jewish rivals undercut them by 5 per cent.136 This 
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competitive edge allowed the Jews to gain Christian customers which provoked the 
charge that the Jews did ‘eat us and our children out of all our trade’ and raised the 
threat of retaliatory action.137  
Although the Jews had full property rights, they were excluded from voting in 
Assembly elections, or holding office above constable, and so lacked a voice in island 
government. 138  Thus the Jews were exposed to discriminatory measures such as 
the imposition of a separate tax on the community ‘in the lump’ at regular intervals 
from the 1690s.139 Nonetheless, leading Jewish merchants were able to limit the 
damage through a series of bargains with the political elites. They combined with  
governors, African Company agents, naval captains, and South Sea Company agents, 
in various ‘exclusive’ trading arrangements. In these, the Christians gained the 
benefits of the Sephardim’s social capital, and the Jews gained, both the opportunity 
to limit competition though manipulating the regulatory regime to their advantage, 
and also improved security.140 By giving the Christian elite a stake in their business, 
the Sephardim raised the cost of the type of retaliatory action which had so often 
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destabilized Jewish life in the past and gained political protection as seen in William 
Wood’s energetic defence of their rights in the 1730s. 141 
VI 
In the last two decades, historians have highlighted the importance of the 
web of illicit commercial transactions which connected competing national 
networks to create an integrated Atlantic economy but have paid little attention to 
how cooperation worked across borders. Of necessity, participants acted without 
the legal protections and state enforcing institutions which are often afforded a 
central role in narratives of modernization. In the case of Jamaica, a hub of illicit 
trade, most merchants found it difficult to survive in this high-risk environment but 
members of the Sephardic diaspora, a traditional, communitarian group, with strong 
private-order institutions, had competitive advantages which they exploited with 
vigour. Equipped with appropriate language skills, and long-standing links to the 
Iberian empires, the Sephardim did not scatter at random but rather chose to settle 
communities at Jamaica and other strategic points in the web of illicit commerce 
which distributed Spanish American riches around the Atlantic and beyond. Here, 
they did not rely on inate attributes of kinship, ethnicity, or religion but restricted 
entry and cultivated attributes which ensured that group behaviour could be 
carefully monitored, and high levels of social discipline maintained, with credible 
rewards and punishments which were reinforced by their outsider status.  
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High levels of trustworthiness within the group provided a competitive 
advantage which did stimulate envy and retaliation but also allowed the Sephardim 
to combine with the Christian elite to capture rent-seeking opportunities and obtain 
political protections. Far from falling away, and becoming irrelevant, as 
modernization gained pace, the Sephardic diaspora survived and flourished because 
it built on its historical and geographical legacy to construct strong private-order 
institutions which continued to be necessary in large swathes of the economy where 
neither impersonal corporations, or state enforcement mechanisms, were able to 
manage risk. Furthermore, merchant diasporas continue to play a key role in high-
risk environments and remain important in understanding the processes of 
globalization today.  
